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Social Capital: A review from an ethics perspective
Abstract
Social  capital  has  as  its  key element  the value  of  social  relationships  to  generate
positive  outcomes,  both for  the key parties  involved and for  wider  society.  Some
authors have noted that social capital nevertheless has a dark side. There is a moral
element to such a conceptualisation, yet there is scarce discussion of ethical elements
within  the  social  capital  literature.  In  this  paper  ethical  theory  is  applied  to  four
traditions  or  approaches  to  economic  social  capital:  neo-capitalism;
network/reputation;  neo-Tocquevellian;  and  development.  Each  is  considered  in
detail, and subject to ethical analysis by the application of utilitarianism, Kantianism,
justice and rights, and ethic of care. Accordingly the assumption that social capital is
either  value-neutral  or  a  force  for  good  is  critiqued  and  a  framework  for
understanding social capital from an ethics perspective presented.
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Introduction
Social capital understood as “the goodwill that is engendered by the fabric of social
relations and that can be mobilized to facilitate action” (Adler and Kwon 2002: 17) –
is a concept predicated on societal  actors’ propensity to develop relationships with
one another. If we judge the success of a concept  by its adoption across different
scholarly disciplines and practice, then social capital is triumphant. It has been used
by those engaged with political science, development studies, sociology, urbanology,
organization theory and management.  Since Adler and Kwon (2002) and Lee (2009)
have  comprehensively  reviewed  social  capital  from  a  business  and  management
perspective in general terms, it is not our purpose to repeat that here. Instead we build
on and develop their work by enhancing our understanding of the dark side of social
capital through a review of social capital from an ethics perspective. 
We  argue  that  widespread  enthusiasm  to  work  with  the  intuitively  appealing
framework of social capital is hampered by an unwillingness to maintain a critical eye
on its full ethical implications. Even business ethics scholars have been using social
capital  theory without  reflecting  seriously on associated  ethical  issues  (Fuller  and
Tian 2006; Muthuri,  Matten and Moon 2009; Russo and Perrini 2009; Spence and
Schmidpeter  2003).  The  concept  has  strong  links  with  familiar  business  ethics
territory such as reciprocity, stakeholder relationships, community engagement, trust,
development and social cohesion, and could arguably be of great value to our field, if
handled  carefully.  Without  a  rounded  critique  of  social  capital,  researchers  -  and
ultimately  managers  and  policy-makers  acting  on  that  research  –  run  the  risk  of
overlooking  the  ethical  issues  and  consequences  of  endorsing  the  concept,  and
undermining any good which it may engender. The ethical issues around social capital
are  many and varied according to the perspective taken of both the social  capital
concept  and  ethics.  It  is  our  task  to  provide  a  nuanced  analysis  of  a  range  of
perspectives of social capital by applying ethical theory. 
The theoretical core of social capital is that aspects of social structure facilitate action
for those within the structure; social capital  is therefore concerned with examining
patterns of embedded relations – built over time – that inhere in social structures and
their ability to facilitate individual (micro), organizational (meso) and group (macro)
level benefits.  Social  capital  is thus a relational  theory of social  interaction which
understands actors and their purposeful actions as inter-dependent. 
 “Intellectual and academic success does not come without controversy.” (Castiglione,
Van Deth and Wolleb 2008: 1). In social capital’s case these controversies include
questions over the legitimacy of the theory in terms of its definition, quantification
and operationalization (e.g. Locke 1999). Social capital is burdened with a ‘plethora
of definitions’ (Adam and Roncevik 2003: 158), which has generated a substantial
sub-set  of  conceptual  literature  offering  reviews and syntheses  of  this  definitional
diversity (Adler and Kwon 2002; Portes 1998; Paxton 1999; Field 2003; Lee 2009) as
well  as  empirical  research  in  business  and  management  (for  example  Cohen  and
Fields  1999;  Edelman  et  al  2004;  Newell  et  al  2004;  Hoffman  et  al 2005)  and
corporate  social  responsibility/business  ethics  (Spence,  Schmidpeter  and  Habisch
2004; Muthuri  et  al 2009; Russo and Perrini 2010). However,  we agree that  with
Woolcock and Radin (2008: 412-413) that the focus on establishing a lexical  and
theoretical consensus is misplaced. 
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Thus, social capital can be understood as an ‘umbrella construct’ (Hirsch and Levin
1999)  or,  using  biological  terminology,  as  “a  genotype  with  many  phenotypic
applications”  (Adam  and  Roncevic  2003:  158).  Social  capital’s  antecedents  and
consequences  are  integrated  and  self-reinforcing:  social  capital  is  thus  “…not
unilinear but circular and multilinear” (Ibid: 178). Hence it is a concept which is at
once both appealing in its apparent simplicity and complicated by its many and varied
forms and applications. 
In seeking to narrow-down the version of social capital of relevance in the current
paper, we focus on economic social capital, not least since that is the context for the
business activity with which our research is concerned. This form of social capital is
also the one adopted by most theoretical scholars of social capital, however, this paper
will interpret social capital in its economic context as belonging to a social economics
tradition originating in Polanyi’s analysis of the ‘disembedding’ of the economy from
wider society (The Great Transformation 1944). There is a considerable difference
between  Karl  Polanyi’s  ‘fictitious  commodities’  hankering  after  a  pre-capitalist
golden age and James Coleman’s ‘rational choice’ view of social capital. However,
both interpretations share a critical view of the asocial nature of classical and neo-
classical economic perspectives originating in the Scottish Enlightenment. The socio-
economic  analysis’  most  significant  scholars  are  the social  network theorist  Mark
Granovetter (1973, 1985, 1992 and 2005) and in explicitly social capital terms, James
Coleman (1998, 1990). 
The embedded view of social capital in the economy and the core understanding of
social  capital  both  refer  to  the  processes  that  generate  outcomes  from  social
interaction and cooperation. These social capital processes have an ethical dimension
because all interaction in social relationships, to a greater or lesser degree, has the
potential for moral components (Pastoriza et al 2008). However, the ethical aspects of
social capital have been described as ‘under-conceptualised’ (Preuss 2004: 154-164)
and the explicit literature applying ethics to social capital is limited as we will go on
to show. 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we apply ethical theories to
themes  within  the  economic  approach  of  social  capital  (primarily  neo-capitalism;
network/reputation; neo-Tocquevellian; and development). We draw particularly on
the most relevant  ethical theories which we determine to be utilitarianism, justice,
Kantianism and an ethic of care. We conclude by identifying the implications of our
application of ethical theory to social capital for future researchers. 
Applying Ethics to Social Capital: Exploring the Dark Side
Most approaches to social capital stress the positive externalities of social connections
and  informal  relationships  which  are  theorised  to  result  in  trust,  shared  norms,
solidarity, and civic mindedness. As Field (2003: 71) observes: “there shines out a
warm  glow.  Social  capital’s  ‘dark  side’,  by  contrast,  remains  largely  unknown
terrain.”  However, a good number of authors do acknowledge the downsides to social
capital including Edelman et al. (2004), Locke (1999), Leenders and Gabbay (1999)
and Portes (1998). Others have applied social capital in empirical contexts to identify
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negative aspects (e.g. in terms of class and entrepreneurship (Anderson and Miller
2003),  rural  entrepreneurs  (Kalantaridis  and  Bika  2006),  behaviour  of  individual
business  people  such  as  Bernard  Madoff  (Manning  2010),  Danish  business
associations  (Svendsen  and  Svendsen  2004)  and  community  forestry  (Wilshusen
2009)).  Portes (1998: 15) summarises problematic aspects of social capital as being
‘at  least’  the  exclusion  of  others,  excessive  claims  on  members  of  the  group,
restrictions  on  individual  freedoms,  group closure  and the  downward levelling  of
norms based on group solidarity. Other related outcomes include distrust and lack of
cooperation, thereby impeding – rather than enhancing - economic progress.
Putnam also recognises the potential  limitations of the emphasis on shared norms,
languages  and networks,  when he cautions over the ‘Dark Side of Social  Capital’
(2000: 350-363) and concedes that there is a “...classic liberal objection to community
ties:  community  restricts  freedom  and  encourages  intolerance.”  (Ibid:  351)  For
example, in the 1950s a, “…surfeit of social capital seemed to impose conformity and
social division” (Ibid: 352). This dark side is given voice in a collection of criticisms
that  interpret  Putnam’s  social  capital  as  class  based,  and  elitist  for  providing  a
bulwark in favour of the prevailing economic policies (Manning 2010).
This can apply as much in the perpetuation of elites or key groups in the work place
as  in  wider  society,  and is  reminiscent  of  Bourdieu’s  (1986)  conceptualisation  of
social capital as relating to “privileged individuals (who) maintain their position by
using their connections with other privileged people” (cited in Field 2003: 28). Based
on this, it is easy to spot the potential moral deficiencies of social capital in simple
statements such as those of Lin, defining social capital as, “embedded resources in the
networks accessed and used to attain status.”(Lin 2001: 79) Social capital is premised
on “investment in social relations with expected returns in the market place” (Ibid:
19), or put simply: ‘It’s not just what you know but who you know.’ (Lin 2001: 40)  It
is our task in the current paper to add some precision to these broad indications of
ethical problems associated with social capital. 
In the business context, the ‘not what you know but who you know’ issue is discussed
by Stevenson and Greenberg (2000: 652) commenting that: “some actors are enabled
by their network position, and others are constrained”, i.e. there is no guarantee that
the  enabled  individuals  are  necessarily  the  best.  When  it  comes  to,  for  example,
knowledge-sharing,  social capital,  through its focus on a limited group of network
‘insiders’ and by extension organizational ‘subgroups’, may hinder intrapreneurship
and  impose  non-reciprocal  obligations  that  lead  to  the  organisation  favouring  the
subgroup goals  over  the  goals  of  the  larger  organization  (Adler  and Kwon 2002;
Locke 1999; cited in Willem and Scarbrough 2006). On a broader business level,
cartelisation and business friendships may lead to obligations to help each other and
opportunities for collaboration (Adler and Kwon 2002). However they may also lead
to lower productivity, higher prices, non-responsiveness to customer needs, lack of
enterprise, stagnation and inefficiency (Ingram and Roberts 2000; Field 2003; Adler
and  Kwon 2002).  At  a  societal  level,  a  commonly  quoted  example  develops  this
possibility into a basis for social exclusion: Puerto Rican drug dealers in New York, it
is claimed, do everything to keep one another within the drug milieu, to the extent that
it would be treason to mix with the whites in an attempt at social upward mobility
(Portes 1998: 17). 
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The common theme is that when bonding social capital  takes place within a well-
delineated  and close-knit  group, the resulting  bonds can operate  such that  outside
influences are excluded and damaging group norms enforced (Johnston and Percy-
Smith  2002),  resulting  in  an  aggregate  loss  for  those  inside  the  network  and
potentially the wider organization and/or society.
To sum up the arguments regarding social capital’s ‘dark side’, it is a resource that
can be subject to high levels of selectivity and manipulation by actors using it and
those subject to it, and this can lead to great inequalities and perverse outcomes in the
attainment of optimum ‘economic outcomes’. Such concerns lead Adler and Kwon to
conclude  that:  “social  capital  research  would  benefit  from  a  more  systematic
assessment of risks as well as benefits… One actor's social capital advantage is often
another actor's disadvantage, and research on the differential access to social capital is
therefore  a  high priority  (Lin 1999)” (2002:  35).  This  is  the basis  for  the current
paper, which seeks to deepen our understanding of social capital’s dark side from an
ethics perspective. 
Most social capital literature reviews are either structured to consider the theory by
discussing key personages, usually designated as Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (1988;
1990) and Putnam (2000; Field 2003) or thematically (Lesser 2000; Castiglione, Van
Deth and Wolleb 2008). Both approaches are valid, however this review will take the
latter  thematic  structure as its  organising principle,  since in this  way traditions  or
approaches to social capital  most relevant to business can be discussed with direct
reference to their ethical content and not through the filter of one of the key social
capital authors. Our analysis of the social capital literature suggests the application of
four  different  ethical  theories  which  will  reveal  a  range  of  ethical  issues:
utilitarianism, justice, Kantianism and the ethic of care. Table One at the end of this
section summarizes the discussion. 
First, we introduce the approaches to social capital which position it as within the
tradition  of  new-capitalism;  as  a  network/reputation  approach;  as  neo-
Tocquevellianism or as an approach to development. As shown in Table One, we then
apply four ethical  theories.  It  is not the purpose in this article  to dwell on ethical
theory  per se, but to apply ethical theory to better understand the nuances of social
capital. We assume a basic understanding of utilitarianism, justice, Kantianism and
care prior to reading this article. Our choice of ethical theory is guided by the desire to
incorporate a range of perspectives on moral behaviour, hence we chose an approach
which looks at the consequences of actions (utilitarianism),  the fairness of actions
(justice), principals and duty (Kantianism) and relationships (care). The four theories
chosen are done so because of their range and difference in terms of the focus of the
judgment about ethical behaviour. There is also somewhat of a precedent in using
these theories in business ethics, though we have sought not to be constrained by this
but to choose theories which indeed are most relevant in assessing social capital. For
example, the ethic of care is arguably the least commonly applied theory of these four,
but because social capital is in part at least about relationships and that is the moral
focus of the ethic of care, we deemed it to be highly relevant in this instancei.
Social capital as neo-capitalism
The first  theme this  analysis  will  address is  social  capital  as neo-capitalism.  Neo-
capitalist  approaches  share  a  common  ‘capitalization’  perspective  drawn  from
6
economic terminology which focuses on the “investment of resources with expected
returns in the marketplace. Capital is resources when these resources are invested and
mobilized  in  the  pursuit  of  profit-as  a  goal  in  action.”  (Lin  2001:  3)  Moreover,
according to Ahn and Ostrom: “All forms of capital involve investments that increase
the probability of higher returns from individuals and joint efforts over a future time
period.”(2008: 72). This ‘neo-capital’ extension of economic theory drew inspiration
from Adam Smith’s perception that “included all the acquired and useful abilities of
the population in a country as part of capital.” (Lin 2001: 8) 
Such conceptualizations  of social  and economic activity  resonate directly  with the
ethical  theory  of  utilitarianism,  a  consequentialist  theory  which  stresses  the
achievement of the long-term maximum utility for society as a whole, evaluating the
moral worth of an action according to the results flowing from it. The principle of
utility refers to the ethical goal of promoting overall  welfare (Bentham 1789; Mill
1859). In simple terms, this is often presented as a cost-benefit analysis wherein an
action is morally right if it  leads to the greatest good for the greatest number (the
greatest happiness principle) and minimises harm. 
Of course, in a situation where it is the  aggregate utility that counts, one person’s
increase  of  utility  may be offset  by a  reduction  in  that  of  another,  alerting  us  to
justice-based concerns with neo-capital theory perspectives on social capital (Rawls
1971). As a result, utilitarianism is disadvantaged by the difficulty of allowing some
to  suffer  because  of  the  moral  imperative  of  achieving  the  greatest  good  for  the
greatest number. 
In  business  ethics,  the  concept  of  utility  is  a  popular  model  that  has  a  wide
application,  which overlaps to a certain extent with the economic principle that is
called,  not  coincidentally,  utility  maximisation.  Fine  and  Green  argue  against
“economics as a colonizing social science” (2000: 78-93), in which the neo-capital
approach is to reduce individuals to forms of capital,  using economic language to
analyse  social  and  relational  phenomena.  Indeed,  in  relation  to  its  utilitarian
underpinnings, social capital as a concept has been criticised by McCleneghan (2003:
437) as representing, through the work of Granovetter (1985), Coleman (1988), Portes
(1995)  and  Woolcock  (2000):  “an  early  incursion  by neoclassical  economics  into
sociological thought through rational choice theory, extended and developed through
network theory”. There is a clear use of utilitarian language in her account of how, in
this  process,  the  ‘social’  element  of  social  capital  has  become subordinated  “to  a
particular form of economic theorizing.  Everything,  including relations of conflict,
can  now  be  viewed  as  forms  of  capital  which,  when  they  favour  particularistic
interests over the general good, are understood in terms of the concept’s ‘dark side’.”
(McCleneghan 2003: 437)
Social capital in networks and reputation
The  next  two  approaches  to  social  capital  flow from such  concerns,  and will  be
considered jointly, due to their strong interrelationship: the second approach is social
capital in networks, and the third is social capital as reputation. Network theory is vast
(for  an  overview  see  Nohria  and  Eccles  1992) and  its  relation  to  social  capital
disputed. According to Lin, social capital is a network theory (2001) and Burt also
adopts  a  structural  understanding  of  the  concept  (2000;  2005)  as  do  Gargiulo  &
Bernassi (2000). However many social capital authors regard network claims to be
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too insular and overblown. Putnam, for instance, argues that network theory is limited
and quotes the Palo Alto Research Centre in relation to the ultimate network,  the
internet,  saying: “that  information itself  needs a social  context  to  be meaningful.”
(2000: 172) 
It  is  not  surprising  that  there  are  a  number  of  ethical  concerns  over  the  network
approach to social  capital,  given the universal claims made for this approach. The
most  important  ethical  issue,  however,  is  rarely  discussed,  that  is  the
instrumentalization  of  social  relations  which  we  can  reframe  in  clear  Kantian
perspectives as using others as a means to one’s own ends. Thus, it has been argued
that the network approach to social capital is overly mechanical and arguably strips
individuals and groups of their emotional and instinctive need for social interaction,
within a syntax more suited to computer circuitry. Moreover, Fukuyama has argued
that: “Networks, understood as informal ethical relationships, are therefore associated
with  phenomena  like  nepotism,  favouritism,  intolerance,  in-breeding,  and  non-
transparent, personalistic arrangements.” (2000: 202) Such perspectives are entirely in
conflict with Kant’s moral imperative for univeralizability so that all individuals must
be treated in the same way according to rational principles, rather than relationship
based (i.e. he claimed we should not favour a relative over a stranger) (Kant 2005,
orig. 1785). 
The issue of trust  (Sobel 2002) is  developed further in our third related theme of
social capital as a reputation theory, which analyses levels of trust and credibility, and
in the economic context conceptualises reputation as a capital asset to be promoted
and  protected.  For  example,  from  an  economic  understanding  of  social  capital,
Dasgupta  (2005:  56)  argues  that  the  role  of  mutual  enforcement  in  repeated
interactions is to create “a creditable threat by members of a community that stiff
sanctions would be imposed on anyone who broke an agreement could deter anyone
from breaking it.” The threat’s credibility would be grounded in ‘rules of behaviour’
or social norms. 
This understanding of reputation belongs to a well-established research stream that
examines reputation processes from a social perspective. Such a social capital analysis
originated with Coleman’s vignettes on the New York diamond market and the Kahn
el  Khalili  market  of  Cairo,  in  terms  of  network  closure  creating  ‘obligations,
expectations, trustworthiness of structures’ (Coleman 1988). Influenced by Coleman,
and reflective of network theory, Burt has written extensively on reputation which he
conceptualises  as  a  relational  asset  (2005:  100-101).  Burt  also  considers  that  the
network closure reputation mechanism creates economic value by decreasing labour
costs:  “The more closed the network, the higher the quality and quantity  of labor
available at a given price within the network.” (Ibid: 148) This is due to deeply shared
goals  and  peer  pressure  ensuring  guilt-induced  conformity.  Burt  illustrates  this
observation quoting approvingly of the late Apple CEO, Steve Jobs, on work teams:
“The greatest people are self-managing. They don’t need to be managed. Once they
know what to do, they’ll go out and figure how to do it.” (2005: 149)
Putnam sought to distinguish between bonding and bridging social capital,  arguing
that the former is likely to have illiberal effects because it seeks to build networks of
the  already  like-minded  to  the  exclusion  of  others  (Putnam 2000:  358).  Bridging
social capital, he argues, which builds connections across groups and is inclusive in
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nature, offers the potential to solve some of society’s most intractable problems (ibid:
363). Thus from a justice perspective, we can discern a problem of poorly distributed
justice where bonding social capital is displayed – perhaps among a particular ethnic,
religious or class group of society. Svendsen and Svendsen (2004), in their analysis of
Danish dairy producers and sports halls, argue from an empirical basis that bridging
social capital results in overall positive externalities for the common good, hence the
suggestion of bridging social capital being associated with a justice perspective. 
Lin  (1981)  has  written  extensively  on  the  connection  between  social  capital  and
reputation  and  has  developed  the  idea  of  relational  rationality,  with  reference  to
Coleman’s  notion  of  social  credits;  that  is,  ‘credit  slips’  on  which  an  actor  in  a
network can draw if necessary (Coleman 1990: 306). In Coleman’s conception, “…
creating obligations by doing favours can constitute a kind of insurance policy.” Thus
unequal transactions create credits and debts, and result in different social standing,
which  is  one  understanding  of  reputation.  Further  examples  of  social  capital
interpretations  of  reputation  include  Fukuyama  who  equates  reputation  with
recognition  (1995:  359),  Nahapiet  and  Ghoshal  who  view  it  as  deriving  from
relational factors (1998: 252) and Putnam who understands reputation as a result of
dense social networks (2000: 136). 
The ethical dimensions of the networking and reputation forms of social capital relate
to the inter-connection of reputation with identity forming processes, coercion and
free-will, and inequality. Forming reputation in a closed network may create ‘in’ and
‘out’ groups and thus potentially lead to discrimination to the out group as well as to
‘downward levelling  norms’ (Portes  1998) to  the  ‘in’  group.  For  example,  ethnic
minority firms will often trade within a shared social network based on trust (Janjuha-
Jivraj 2003). However, these networks impose economic costs, in terms of being, for
example, ‘welfare hotels’, and in terms of limiting growth.
Burt’s duo-reputation hypotheses also have ethical dimensions, in terms of reputation
ownership. In his first ‘bandwidth hypothesis’, the actor owns their reputation in the
sense that they define their behaviour which in turn defines their reputation. However,
under the second ‘echo hypothesis’, reputation is not owned by the individual, but
rather is owned by “the people in whose conversations it is built, and the goal of those
conversations is not accuracy so much as bonding between the speakers.” (Burt 2005:
218) Thus in the second echo hypothesis: “The key to establishing a good reputation
is to get people in closed networks talking to one another.” Moreover, under the echo
hypothesis, first impressions are crucial for setting in chain favourable impressions.
And:  “Reputations  do  not  emerge  from  good  work  directly  so  much  as  from
colleagues’  stories about  the  work.” (Ibid:  218) How far  this  accords with reality
remains to be investigated, however, it does suggest ethical implications in terms of
how certain individuals  and groups face discrimination in not possessing the right
social credentials, or in the vernacular not having the ‘right school tie’. 
Social  capital  in  its  optimal  form,  then,  seen  from a  utilitarian  perspective,  is  in
keeping  with  the  neo-capitalist  approach,  provides  benefits  for  the  ‘broader
aggregate’, ideally becoming ‘collective goods’ rather than the private property of the
focal group who created and initially sought to benefit from it (Adler and Kwon 2002;
Coleman  1988).  These  benefits  of  voluntary  cooperation  manifest,  it  is  claimed,
through the provision of macro and micro economic,  political  and social  benefits,
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such as a competitive and innovative business environment,  trusting communities,
better regional performance, improved health and education and so on, that all go to
improve  individual  and  societal  well-being  (Adler  and  Kwon  2002).  From  the
utilitarian perspective,  ‘pure’ public goods should not exclude ‘outsiders’ from the
benefits developed and accrued by the insiders, nor should this apply in the reverse.
However,  as  we  have  noted,  the  risks  of  the  negative  (perhaps  unintended)
externalities of bonding social capital in the form of, for example, social exclusion
and over-embeddedness, the exercise of power, and blocks on innovation resulting in
anti-competitiveness, among many others, are much in evidence in the social capital
literature, showing that the optimum outcome of the common good is not achieved.
Thus the extent and the ethical desirability that reputational and network approaches
can achieve are both highly questionable. Putnam has conceded the disadvantages of
strong communities restricting freedom and promoting intolerance. As he admits in a
brief aside: “Networks, and the associated norms of reciprocity are generally good for
those inside the network, but the external effects of social capital are by no means
always positive….Therefore it is important to ask how the positive consequences of
social capital – mutual support, cooperation, trust, institutional effectiveness – can be
maximized and the negative manifestations – sectarianism, ethnocentrism, corruption
– minimized” (Putnam 2000: 21-22).
A further ethical implication of reputation and networks as ‘capital assets’ arises out
of the assumption the poor cannot afford it, running contrary to views that interpret
social capital as the only asset the poor possess. For example, research focussing on a
poor US community, concluded that while creating and later paying of obligations is a
cornerstone of social capital, deprived residents show an aversion to engagement in
neighbourly actions, rejecting reciprocal indebtedness and avoiding relationships that
would commit them to any obligations to others (Hutchinson 2004). Consideration of
relationships  leads  us  to  the  ethic  of  care  (Gilligan  1982).  From an ethic  of  care
perspective  this  alerts  us  to  some  complex  analytical  quandaries  around  the
implications  when  potential  relationships  are  rejected  because  of  the  additional
obligation, reciprocity and burden required where a relationship exists. 
The implications  of approaches two and three chime very closely with arguments
regarding social capital’s ‘dark side’. According to these concerns, some economic
actors have social capital that is more useful than others. It is a resource that can be
subject  to high levels of selectivity  and manipulation by actors using it  and those
subject  to  it,  and this  can lead  to  great  inequalities  and perverse outcomes in  the
attainment of optimum ‘economic outcomes’ (see for example Ayios (2003; 2004) for
the perverse consequences of such forms of social capital on foreign investment in
post-communist Russia). The utilitarian benefit of firm profitability can be threatened
when innovation and entrepreneurship are thwarted through these processes, i.e. it is
possible that there is over-reliance on the strong ties associated with dense networks
of social capital and their resultant obligations (Granovetter 1973).  The very norms
and group identification that have the potential to increase organizational or group
performance  can,  dependent  on  the  focal  actor,  and  the  attendant  network  and
assumptions  of  it,  create  barriers  and  inertia  (Gargiulo  and Bernassi  2000).  Such
concerns lead Adler and Kwon to conclude that: “One actor's social capital advantage
is often another actor's disadvantage” (2002: 35).
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Characterizations of social capital that deal with inequality bring the concept within
the perspective of the ethic of justice, which emphasizes individual autonomy, choice
and freedom, ensured through the preservation of equality, and enacted through rules
that must be followed by all to ensure fairness for all, such that the least advantaged in
society (often overlooked on a utilitarian analysis) gain the greatest benefit (see in
particular Rawls 1971). Relationships in this context are established through respect
for others’ rights and the observance of the attached obligations, established through
the  ‘highest  principles’  (Held  2006;  French  and  Weis  2000;  Sevenhuijsen  2000).
Portes  (1998) has  criticised  social  capital  over  its  potential  for  exclusion,  loss  of
individual freedom, insularity and excessive obligations.  The trust and cooperation
engendered through the focal group and its actors, while popularly seen as delivering
positive outcomes, in reality have the potential to translate into a mistrust of outsiders
and  the  generation  of  downwardly  mobile  group  norms  that  discourage  external
cooperation and encourage selectivity and abuse. Social capital is both achieving and
risking the utilitarian benefit of economic and societal prosperity through an unequal
distribution of justice-based fairness and equal rights amongst certain members of the
community  who  are  bound  by  restrictive  relationships  and  power  imbalances.
However, the utilitarian perspective, with its focus on aggregate welfare, may well
trample  individual  needs  and  rights,  reflecting  a  popular  tension  in  the  ethics
literature, that: “Differing perspectives subordinate individual liberty to the primacy
of the common good (Etzioni 1999) or call for individual liberty as the overriding
principle” (Spence and Schmidpeter 2003: 94).
The justice perspective therefore points to the problem of ‘negative freedom’, in the
sense of standing in the way of a free or autonomous life (Giddens 1998). However,
promoters of an ethic of care perspective may dispute such a perspective on social
relations (Gilligan 1982; Held 2006).  Rather than  key principles of equal rights and
the most extensive system of basic liberties being open to all, the ethic of care alerts
us to the  social element of social capital. This conceptualization of ethics will arise
again during our analysis of theme five, below.
Concerns over the instrumentalization of social relations inherent within the network
approach also fall within the Kantian perspective. It is generally agreed (Micewski
and  Troy  2007;  L’Etang  1992)  that  Kant’s  “first  and  foremost  formula”  of  the
Categorical Imperative (Micewski and Troy 2007: 22) is universalizability, i.e. “Act
only  on  that  maxim through which  you can  at  the  same time  will  that  it  should
become a universal law” (L’Etang 1992; 742). When approaching the underpinnings
of the network approach from this perspective, actors are first and foremost required
to act always in such a way that everyone would agree on this being a rule or law for
behaviour to which everyone would agree. However, it is the second element of the
categorical  imperative  that  captures  attention  in  particular,  with  its  emphasis  on
human relationships, i.e. that persons should never be treated as a means to an end,
but only as an end in themselves – respect persons under all circumstances: “our most
basic moral intuitions require a respect for persons” (Moberg and Meyer 1990: 866).
The network approach only respects others in an instrumental way for what they can
give  to  the  recipient  of  such  ‘social  capital’,  then  potentially  creating  a  rule  for
behaviour,  or  obligation  for  future  reciprocity  based  on  such  a  social  exchange.
Kantianism would  find  this  immoral  if  one  is  using  others  as  a  means  only,  and
therefore ignoring their nature as “autonomous agents” (ibid). 
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Social capital as Neo-Tocquevellianism 
To return to our social capital themes, the fourth theme concerns social capital as a
neo-Tocquevellian theory and relates to the scholarship of two of the most influential
theoretical authors Putnam and Fukuyama who both claim to be working within a de
Tocquevellian tradition. For illustration, in Putnam’s evaluation de Tocqueville is “the
patron saint of contemporary social capitalists” (2000: 292). Fukuyama (1995) also
quotes liberally from de Tocqueville and is lavish in acknowledging his influence as
“the most important theorist of social capital” (2000: 19).
Moreover, Putnam’s central  themes,  with regard to civic community,  (Ibid: 87-93)
and Fukuyama’s emphasis on culture as an economic resource (1995) both have their
antecedents  in  de  Toqueville’s  ‘Democracy  in  America’  (1835);  that  is,  civic
engagement,  political equality,  solidarity,  trust, tolerance and associations as social
structures  of  cooperation,  are  all  identifiable  Tocquevellian  themes.  Further  these
themes  have  been  identified  in  an  historical  sequence  of  theories  bolstering  the
prevailing  socio-economic status  quo (Paxton 1999: 88-127).  For instance,  Wheen
notes (2004: 221) that President Clinton wrote an effusive letter to Amitai Etzioni
praising  his  book,  ‘The  Spirit  of  Community’  (1993)  and  Etzioni’s  moral  and
authoritarian communitarianism (1988) can be identified as an immediate precursor to
Putnam and Fukuyama’s social capital in terms of theorising and diagnosing society’s
ills, suggesting broad sweep remedies and also in the political attention that the theory
garnered. 
The rational economic underpinnings of social capital,  presented above under neo-
capitalism approaches,  are strongly evident  in such an account.  However,  such an
understanding of social capital has been vigorously criticised from the political Left
(Baron  et  al,  2000:  2;  Levitas  2004:  41-56).  In  sum,  according  to  critics,  this
Tocquevellian  understanding  of  social  capital  is  little  more  than  anti-statist,
authoritarian neo-communitarianism, which argues for more personal responsibilities
and fewer rights. From this optic, Putnam and Fukuyama are read as advocating a new
form of communitarianism, which stresses the need for the ‘civic deficit’ to be cut not
by state intervention, for example by introducing a more progressive taxation regime;
but rather by encouraging individuals to join ‘legitimate’ voluntary non-governmental
organizations  (NGOs).  Therefore,  the  responsibility  for  social  exclusion  is  shifted
onto the poor: it becomes their individual responsibility to join in and improve their
stock of social capital. 
The ethical aspects of this social capital understanding are the same as those levelled
against  communitarians,  in  terms of  justice-based concerns  over free will  and the
imposition of restrictive normative controls on non-conformists and the marginalised.
Critics of contemporary capitalism would also argue that this version of social capital
can be understood as falling within the parameters of Burkean conservatism with a
stress on allegiance to the status quo and social harmony. The Tocquevellian version
of social capital is thus supportive of the socio-economic status quo and belongs to the
‘sociology  of  regulation’,  concerned  with  emphasising  unity  and  cohesiveness
(Burrell  and Morgan 1979:  10-20) to the detriment  arguably of addressing ethical
issues of increasing inequality, especially economic inequality. For example Levitas
has  concluded  that  social  capital  “simultaneously  obscures  and  legitimates  wider
social  inequalities,  and  provides  a  lens  through  which  the  rich  become  virtually
invisible.” (2004: 49)
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These views can be criticised on grounds of both utility and justice. Not only are the
powerful  selective  in  what  and  with  whom  they  share  knowledge  and  power,
excluding some and including others, but those within and external to the network
may find their freedom limited in terms of acceptable behaviour, obligations to key
parties, and their abilities to exercise independent thought and behaviours, let alone
(economic) development and self-determination. This leads to the creation of a ‘social
prison’ (Portes 1998), and, as pointed out previously on utilitarianism, the goals and
biases of the closely connected subgroup may then come to dominate the whole of
society. Similarly, justice-based concerns over liberty and freedom in particular are a
key criticism of communities who generate norms and obligations that those within
them are committed to, and indeed which members will be loathe to deviate from for
fear  of  becoming  an  outsider,  or  which  they  cannot  break,  because  they  are an
outsider. Clearly, such norms are not concomitant with freedom of choice.
Further, Kantianism’s second formulation of respect for persons again is applicable
here  in  its  rejection  of  instrumentalizing  human  relationships,  although  of  course
Kant’s  overriding  formulation  of  universalisability  of  laws  for  everyone  is  also
highlighted  here  in  the  weakness  of  such  an  objective  perspective.  Specifically,
Kant’s promotion of a universalising objectivity  in the application of principles is
countered by “evidence of Kant’s inability to account for the moral value of emotions
and emotional attachments”,  as typified through his idealised example of the cold-
hearted benefactor (Stohr 2002: 187). Returning to respect for persons as a guiding
principle,  Martin  (1991) points out that if  one respects  another  as an autonomous
chooser, then “one should not choose another’s ends” (Ibid: 136). The ‘choosing’ by
the ‘status quo’, ‘acceptable’ NGOs etc implies selective choosing by an elite ‘other’
on behalf of recipient ‘others’ who may not have been consulted over such a choice. 
Social capital as development 
The  fifth  theme  is  social  capital  as  a  form  of  development  with  an  attempt  to
“reintroduce  the  social  element  into  capitalism”  (Baron  et  al 2000:  13).  In
methodological  terms,  to  open up “the  way for  different  approaches  to  modelling
social relations, which address some of the moral and technical complexities of their
protean character” (Ibid: 14). Thus in this tradition,  social capital  has instrumental
value  in  capturing  qualitative  phenomena,  which  contrasts  with  the  exclusively
quantitative and asocial  perspective that hitherto dominated.  For example criticism
has been levelled at development agencies, such as the World Trade Organization and
International Monetary Fund for a reliance on overly quantitative models for analysis
and policy recommendations. The argument was that these quantitative models failed
to give adequate weight to the impact of social relations on economic activity and thus
they  inaccurately  abstracted  or  dis-embedded  economic  activity  from  its  social
context. 
Fukuyama reaches the conclusion that social capital analysis is important because: “It
constitutes the cultural component of modern societies” (1999: 1); and is often critical
for understanding development. He also calls on anecdotal evidence to suggest that “it
is difficult for outsiders to foster civil society where it has no local roots.” NGOs,
“simply manage to create a stratum of local elites who become skilled at writing grant
proposals; the organisations they found tend to have little durability once the outside
source of funds dries up.” (2001: 18) Further, according to Wallis and Killerby (2004:
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239)  the  “extraordinary  outburst  of  research…  has  largely  been  motivated  by
academic and policy interest in the explanatory power of social capital with regard to
spatial variation in economic and institutional performance.” 
Wallis and Killerby are of course talking of the utilitarian arguments and perspectives
of social capital and the ‘optimum’ outcomes it can deliver. Brady (1985: 24) has a
word of warning on such a view that could shed light on some of the policy concerns
surrounding social  capital,  i.e.  that  “utilitarianism as  a  system of  public  decision-
making tends to suppress the expression of sympathy and other felt obligations... Any
obligations  or  feelings  of  intrinsic  worth,  apart  from  human  self-interest,  are
comparatively  unimportant.”  On  this  evaluation,  homo  economicus is  seen  as
beholden  to  act  rationally,  instrumentally,  motivated  by  extrinsic  rewards,  and
behaving in isolation from others. Liedtka suggests that it is the shortcomings of this
approach  that  has  led  to  the  “language  of  care  and  relationship-building  …
[appearing]… with prominence in the business literature, driven by the realities of the
marketplace” (1996: 179). These ‘realities’ now reside in a realisation that traditional
views  of  capital  overlook  the  central  role  of  economic  actors  interacting  and
organizing themselves in such a way as to create economic growth and development
(World  Bank:  1998).  Indeed,  social  capital  is  “seldom  defined  so  as  to  include
feelings or emotions. Yet it is feelings of empathy and concern for others-developed
through contact and interaction with them-that provide crucial reinforcement for trust
and cooperation" (Schmid 2002: 751). 
Thus the ethic of care perspective would perceive of social capital as a medium for
interaction that prioritizes the maintenance and nurture of ongoing responsibilities and
relationships.  Morality  is  viewed  in  terms  of  interconnectedness,  focusing  not  on
fairness, autonomy or universal principles, but on the creation and strengthening of
relationships among individuals and their attendant responsibilities (Held 2006). Put
succinctly: “An ethic of care is reflected in concern about how to fulfil conflicting
responsibilities to different people, as opposed to questions of how to resolve claims
of conflicting rights among them” (Simola 2003: 354).
This ties in very closely with approaches to social capital, which view one of its core
motives as the willingness of individuals to look beyond their own self-interest and,
based on sympathy and caring, help those with whom they have an affinity (Schmid
2002). The sympathy of an individual or group towards another individual or group
“may produce a potential benefit, advantage, and preferential treatment for another
person or  group beyond that  expected  in  an  exchange  relationship.  Social  capital
resides in transacting, communicating individuals” (Schmid 2002: 750). 
This tension between ‘positive consequences’ rooted in notions of relationships and
responsibilities  towards  the  other  and  the  ‘negative  manifestations’  of  elitism,
insularity, behavioural control and corruption are closely tied to arguments comparing
the ethic of care perspective with justice-based concerns over restrictions on freedom
and inequality of power and status. While relationships are put at the centre of the
ethic  of  care  that  sees  them as  crucial  to  properly  understanding  ethical  decision
making, Portes’ (1998) and Putnam’s (2000) ‘dark side’ discussions of their abuse in
social  capital  terms  are  echoed  in  the  ethics  literature  in  terms  of  justice-based
critiques of the care ethic. Communal discourses that are distorted and controlled by
powerful agents are seen as subverting the goals of an ethic of responsibility (Dillard
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and  Yuthas  2001).  The  focal  actor  is  bound  through  these  community-based
restrictions, and must be liberated through autonomy, as enacted through justice.
Often,  the  caring  dimension  of  social  capital  is  neglected;  in  particular  when
highlighting the appropriability of social capital, personal relationships are seen as an
asset of potential value to business or other instrumental causes. This suggests the
instrumentalization  of  relationships  to  bringing  positive  consequences  in  spheres
outside  of  personal  life.  The pursuit  of  social  capital  may override  the  pursuit  of
personal  relationships  for  their  own sake.  Social  capital  has  been  found to  bring
benefits to individuals who operate successfully with it. However, the very value of
social capital may be derived from a devaluation of friendship and kinship. Trying to
build  goodwill  by  cultivating  friendship  may  be  thwarted  if  the  motivation  is
disingenuous (Perry 1999: 15). 
Again,  we  return  here  to  Kantianism.  The  criticisms  are  similar  to  those  against
Kantian objectivity, however perverse this is in relation to his insistence on respect for
persons such that they are not used as means to end. However, as shown above, Kant
was  also  able  to  shed  light  on  our  concerns  over  the  ‘paternalistic’  elements  of
development  theory:  “Kant’s  ethical  theory  seems  to  be  particularly  good  at
explaining what is wrong with paternalism… it implies that manipulation of the other,
even  when  this  will  result  in  his  achieving  his  ends,  is  morally  repugnant;  it  is
preferable to allow the other to choose his own means, even when they are, in terms
of his own aims, bad ones; or to reason with the other person and thus to respect his
autonomy as a rational chooser” (Martin 1991: 136). Ironically for a moral theory
much associated with ethical universalism, in such an account Kant is arguing for
plurality  in  the  achievement  of  the  person  subject  to  ‘development’  through
autonomously choosing their own ‘route’ without interference from others who may
hold alternative agendas, however benign those others’ intentions may be.
Table  One  summarizes  our  findings  when  applying  Utilitarianism,  Kantianism,
Justice and the Ethic of Care to the thematic approaches to social capital. 
Insert Table one about here
It is our contention that this table provides the basis for an understanding of social
capital which acknowledges and highlights the ethical content of the concept. We do
not seek to promote one ethical perspective approach over the other, rather it is our
intention  that  both practitioners  and scholars better  understand the implications  of
their actions. Rather than focusing on how to generate and measure social capital, we
wish to support a finer grained reflection on its nature. This work thus dovetails with
the literature on the dark side of social capital which rightly highlights that it is not
necessarily an absolute good. Our contribution is to clarify the different ethical issues
likely to emerge according to a range of approaches to social capital. We chose four
ethical  theories  and four social  capital  traditions  to provide a wide ranging set  of
perspectives.  One version of social  capital  and version of ethics would have been
inadequate in the extreme. 
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Conclusion 
In this paper we have presented a detailed review of approaches and traditions of
economic social capital and examined them through the application of ethical theory.
In doing so we reveal the assumed perspectives which scholars of social capital imbue
in their work. The most basic of these and the one which we seek to challenge with
this paper is that social capital applied in business and management research is either
value neutral or, simply put, a force for good. While research on social capital often
briefly acknowledges what is called ‘the dark side’, very little goes beyond this to
include a balanced ethical perspective within social capital research and accordingly
more  robust  analysis.  Our  goal  is  thus  to  enhance  the  capacity  of  social  capital
researchers in the business and management field. 
Our key contribution is in the value of Table One which summarises the pertinent
ethical  issues  relating  to  social  capital.  It  is  our  hope  that  future  social  capital
researchers will be able to use the table as a starting point for understanding the dark
side of their chosen approach to social capital. For example, a researcher seeking to
investigate  social  capital  in  terms  of  development,  would  be  readily  appraised  of
potential  issues  to  look out  for  with respect  to  maximising  social  good,  equitable
societies,  ensuring  freedom  of  individual  choice  and  the  potential  for
instrumentalization of relationships. Hence the table offers a template of ethical issues
for social capital researchers. We do not claim that this will be exhaustive, but we do
propose that it will improve the depth and quality of social capital research if used
carefully. A second contribution of this paper is to introduce social capital to business
ethicists who have not previously had the opportunity to read work in this area. It is
our hope that the paper inspires some business ethicists to learn more about social
capital and reflect on the value of bringing ethical theory and social capital together. 
Importantly,  we have distinguished between different traditions of economic social
capital.  We identify four key approaches of social capital,  that is, social  capital  as
neo-capitalism, in terms of network/reputation, as neo-Tocquevellianism and in terms
of development. We sincerely encourage future scholars wishing to use social capital
to distinguish between approaches to social capital as we have done, and in doing so
address some of the complexity and confusion around definitions of this  umbrella
concept.  We acknowledge that other traditions of social  capital  are also valid, and
restricting  our  assessment  to  four  is  somewhat  of  a  limitation.  For  example
Bourdieu’s neo-Marxist inter-generational explanation of enduring class advantages is
appropriate for examining educational attainment; e.g., the privileged student with the
right  social  capital  will  be  attuned  to  the  cultural  expectations  of  an  Oxbridge
interview and later  will  also  have  the  social  capital  to  be  finessed  into  the  most
desirable ‘internship’ or occupation. (Field 2003: 16)   Halpern (2005) answers the
question of ‘Why is social capital important’ by considering: economic performance;
health and well being; crime; education; and government and the effective state. In
addition to economic perspectives, Castiglione et al (2008) also consider the concept
from the  perspective  of  democratic  politics,  community  and  society.  While  these
perspectives might not be as directly relevant to the business and management area as
the economics perspective of social capital, they are nevertheless worthy of further
research.
16
Our ethical analysis has been necessarily cursory, given our wish to include a range of
ethical theories and social capital traditions. Future research might seek to deepen the
analysis of anyone of the 16 quadrants in Table One. For example, it could be that
there  is  substantially  more  to  be  said  about  the  application  of  Kantian  theory  to
network  approaches  to  social  capital.  Building  on  this,  we  have  sought  to  give
relatively equal weight to the four ethical theories applied. Others might usefully seek
to  argue  that  one  or  perhaps  two  of  the  theories  are  most  pertinent  and  their
application should be extended. 
The ethical  theories we have drawn upon – utilitarianism, justice,  Kantianism and
ethic of care – are in our view the most salient for economic social capital theory.
However, others may also be relevant. For example, if the individual actors are the
focus of social capital research, then it would be valid to engage with virtue theory
which studies the character of the individual (as has been done by Preuss 2004). As
we have revealed in this paper, applying different ethical theories frequently results in
contradictory analysis of the ethics of a situation. This is the nature of ethics, and it is
the task of the researcher to explicate the associated issues and determine the priority
of the different perspectives. 
The current paper is theoretical in nature, but we would attach considerable value to
empirical  work which seeks to verify and critique the theoretical  observations  we
have made. This would strengthen the credibility of our analysis and extend its value
considerably.  There  is  a  strong  stream of  empirical  work  around  small  business,
entrepreneurship  and  social  capital  which  we  have  cited  in  our  discussions.  This
would be suitable  territory for expanding our work on the ethics of social  capital.
Indeed, there is likely to be some considerable opportunity in the growing context of
social  entrepreneurship,  where social  priorities are at  least  equal to financial  ones,
adding an intriguing layer to social capital analysis.  
It is our hope that this paper has implications beyond the academic.  Social capital
research is desirable to practitioners as a result of its promise of social and economic
improvement. Developing an ethics perspective in social capital research should, in
improving the robustness and the rounded reflection within research, also positively
influence practice and policy. Our ethical application can help practitioners and policy
makers  to  guard  against  negative  unintended  consequences  of  promoting  social
capital. We strongly recommend that research with a specific practical focus engages
with the ethical perspective in social capital.  
Each of our recommendations for future research is applied specifically to business
and management, but to return to where this paper started, with the wide disciplinary
interest  in  social  capital,  researchers  in  other  contexts  (urbanology,  sociology,
community development and planning etc) should also engage with the ethical issues
of applying the concept, and in doing so problematize its sometimes simplistic and
narrow treatment. 
In  conclusion,  in  this  article  we  have  sought  to  provide  “some  balance  to  the
frequently celebratory tone with which the concept [of social capital] is surrounded”
(Portes  1998:  3)  by  applying  ethical  theory.  This  we  argue  is  important  for  the
advancement of an enduringly popular but inadequately critiqued concept. 
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Table One: Summary of the application of ethical theory to four traditions of social capital 
Ethical theories
T
ra
di
tio
ns
 o
f s
oc
ia
l c
ap
ita
l
Social  capital
as….
Utilitarianism Justice Kantianism Ethic of Care
Neo-capitalism Close alignment  between
neo-capital  theory  and
utilitarianism.  Social
capital  is  seen  as
providing  collective
social  goods  and
aggregate welfare. 
Subjugation of the needs of some
in  order  to  achieve  the  greater
good results in distributive justice
concerns.  Particular  concerns
where it is the most disadvantaged
who  pay  the  price  for  the
advantaged. 
Individuals identified as forms
of  capital  rather  than  being
afforded individual respect for
persons. 
No account taken of relationships, rather an
assumption of  people as  rational,  economic
individuals which runs counter to an ethic of
care. 
Network/
Reputation 
The  perspective  of  the
pursuit  of  the  greater
good is dominant but not
necessarily
commensurate  with  the
pursuit  of  individual
goals.
Closed  networks  may  create  ‘in’
and  ‘out’  groups and  be  a  forum
for  coercion  and  inequality  by
social  exclusion.  This  is  a  more
commonly  acknowledged  ‘dark
side’  of social  capital  in terms of
bridging and bonding. 
Instrumentalization  of  social
relations  and  reputation  -
using others as a means to an
end.  Goes  against  Kant’s
universalizability  imperative
by promoting favouritism and
nepotism. 
Undermines  the  value  of  genuine
relationships and promotes relationships built
for  personal  gain  which  are  contrary  to  an
ethic of care, except where in doing so close
personal  relationships  benefit.  Complex
analysis needed of the resistance, for example
of the poor, to enter into relationships which
will create obligations.  
Neo-
Tocquevellianism
Utilitarian  claims  by  the
powerful  to  meet  their
goals subjugate the needs
of the less powerful.
Responsibility for social inclusion
shifted  onto  the  excluded.  State
abdicates  welfare  responsibilities
to  individuals,  communities  and
NGOs.  Imposition  of  preferred
norms goes against liberty and free
will of individuals. 
Fundamental  aspect  of
Kantianism,  demonstrating
that  respect  for  persons  is
violated.
Protecting  those  with  whom  there  is  a
relationship could be in keeping with an ethic
of care. 
Development Assumption  of  optimum
returns  by  promoting
social capital ‘creation’.
Enabling more  equitable  societies
and protection for the least well off
is  commensurate  with  a  justice
based approach. 
Individuals should be allowed
to  formulate  their  own
rationally  arrived  at  choices,
not  guided  by  a  pre-
established  development
agenda. 
Feelings of empathy and concern for others
embraced  but  at  the  cost  of  the  rights  of
individuals  and  elitism.  Instrumentalization
of relationships is inappropriate according to
an ethic of care.
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i For an introduction to ethical theory in the context of business ethics we recommend some of the best established text 
books in this area such as Velasquez (2012) and Crane and Matten (2010). There is also an argument for the inclusion 
of virtue theory, but this has been treated adequately by Preuss (2004).   
